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Abstract	
		
Despite	 years	 of	 crisis,	 the	 euro	 is	 still	 enjoying	 strong	 popular	 support	 in	 many	 of	 the	
Eurozone	 crisis	 countries.	 Given	 the	 high	 costs	 that	 the	 crisis	 has	 imposed	 on	 these	
countries,	this	raises	the	question	why	the	public	thinks	so	favorable	of	the	union,	and	under	
which	 circumstances	 these	 high	 support	 levels	 may	 decrease.	 Using	 original	 survey	 data	
from	three	consecutive	survey	waves	in	Greece	(from	July,	September	and	December	2015),	
we	analyze	why	Greeks	view	the	euro	so	favorably.	We	use	a	detailed	battery	of	questions,	
designed	specifically	to	tap	the	many	explanations	given	in	the	literature	and	public	debate	
for	this	phenomenon,	to	tease	out	the	different	mechanisms.	Using	survey	experiments,	we	
then	specifically	focus	on	the	tradeoff	between	keeping	the	euro	and	austerity.	We	find	that	
as	 individuals	 learn	that	austerity	 is	 the	price	 for	staying	 in	 the	euro,	 their	support	 for	 the	
common	currency	weakens,	a	trend	that	we	can	also	observe	over	time,	as	support	for	the	
euro	 fell	 significantly	 between	 July	 and	 December	 2015.	 Overall,	 our	 paper	 provides	 an	
explanation	why	 political	 elites	 so	 far	 have	 been	 able	 to	 commit	 to	 painful	 austerity	 and	
reforms:	they	had	a	clear	mandate	to	everything	necessary	to	stay	in	the	euro.	Our	results	
suggest,	 however,	 that	 this	 may	 change	 when	 the	 costs	 of	 austerity	 become	 too	 high,	
making	an	exit	for	the	Eurozone	a	distinct	possibility.	
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The	euro	crisis	has	wreaked	havoc	across	 the	peripheral	countries	 in	 the	Eurozone.	
GDP	 levels	 dropped	 significantly	 in	 the	 crisis	 countries.	 In	 2015,	 seven	 years	 after	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 Eurozone	 crisis,	 poverty	 rates	 and	 unemployment	 were	 still	 significantly	
higher	in	all	of	these	states	than	before	the	crisis,	and	youth	unemployment	in	particular	has	
soared.	Over	 the	crisis,	Europeans	have	become	much	more	negative	about	 the	European	
Union,	 trust	 EU	 institutions	 less	 and	 are	 more	 pessimistic	 about	 the	 future	 of	 the	 EU	
(Eurobarometer,	2016).	
Despite	 this	 growing	 euroskepticism,	 one	 hallmark	 of	 European	 integration	 has	
proven	 remarkably	 resilient:	 the	 euro.	 Support	 for	 the	 common	 currency	 has	 been	 stable	
across	 the	 Eurozone	 throughout	 the	 crisis	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Frieden,	 2016;	 Hobolt	 &	
Leblond,	2013;	Hobolt	&	Wratil,	2015;	Roth	et	al.,	2016).1	Before	the	Eurozone	crisis	started,	
an	average	of	68%	of	respondents	 in	the	Eurozone	supported	the	European	economic	and	
monetary	union	(EMU)	with	one	single	currency,	the	euro.	Since	the	outbreak	of	the	crisis	in	
2009,	an	average	of	66%	of	respondents	in	the	eurozone	have	been	supportive	of	the	euro.2	
Even	 in	 those	 countries	 immediately	 affected	 by	 the	 crisis	 (Cyprus,	 Greece,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	
Portugal,	and	Spain)	support	for	the	common	currency	remained	high:	at	the	height	of	the	
crisis	 in	 spring	 2012,	 the	 average	 support	 for	 EMU	 ran	 at	 62%	 in	 these	 countries	
(Eurobarometer,	2012).	
This	consistently	strong	support	for	the	euro	is	surprising	if	one	considers	that	many	
experts	blame	design	 flaws	 in	EMU	as	one	of	 the	main	causes	of	 the	crisis	and	 its	difficult	
and	 slow	 resolution	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Copelovitch	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 De	 Grauwe,	 2016;	 Hall,	
2012).	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 inability	 of	 Eurozone	 members	 to	 devalue	 their	 currency,–	
which	in	this	case	would	mean	leaving	the	eurozone	–	has	pushed	these	countries	to	rely	on	
a	painful	strategy	of	 internal	devaluation.	As	a	result,	governments	 in	the	Eurozone’s	crisis	
countries	have	 implemented	austerity	measures	and	to	a	 lesser	degree	structural	 reforms,	
bringing	hardship	for	many	citizens.		
The	willingness	of	governments	in	these	countries	to	slash	expenditures,	raise	taxes,	
and	 implement	painful	 reforms	 is	 very	puzzling	 from	a	political	 economy	perspective.	 The	
usual	response	to	similar	crises	in	the	past	has	been	to	devalue	the	currency	and	to	default	
																																																						
1	Note	that	enthusiasm	for	the	common	currency	has	decreased	considerably	in	countries	outside	the	
eurozone.	
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on	the	country’s	debt	(Frieden	&	Walter,	2017).	Why	has	no	eurozone	country	chosen	this	
path?	One	likely	answer	is	that	such	a	path	has	been	deeply	unpopular	among	voters,	even	
more	unpopular	than	the	austerity	path	chosen	 instead.	But	this	continued	strong	support	
for	 the	 euro	 in	 eurozone	 countries	 raises	 two	 key	 questions:	 the	 first	 one	 focuses	 on	 the	
reasons	for	the	public’s	favorable	view	of	the	euro:	why	do	voters	in	crisis	countries	support	
staying	 in	 the	 Eurozone,	 even	 though	 this	 has	 put	 their	 countries	 on	 the	 oath	 of	 harsh	
austerity?	The	second	focuses	on	the	sustainability	of	this	support	and	asks	whether	there	is	
a	risk	that	this	support	could	unravel	at	some	point.	
This	paper	examines	these	questions	using	original	survey	data	from	Greece,	where	
the	 fallout	 from	 the	crisis	has	been	gigantic.	Between	2009	and	2014,	 the	country	 saw	 its	
GDP	decrease	by	more	 than	25%,	 a	 figure	 that	 exceeds	 even	 those	 found	after	 the	Great	
Depression.	 The	 country	 implemented	 a	 vast	 fiscal	 consolidation	 program,	 resulting	 in	 a	
reduction	of	the	government’s	budget	deficit	by	11	percentage	points,	bringing	it	below	3%	
of	 GDP	 by	 2014	 (Nelson	 et	 al.	 2011).	 As	 a	 result,	 unemployment	 escalated	 from	
approximately	10%	in	2009	to	almost	25%	in	2013.	Nonetheless,	even	in	Greece	a	majority	
of	 respondents	 has	 supported	 EMU	and	 the	 euro	 throughout	 the	 crisis.	 Although	 support	
has	dropped,	almost	two	thirds	of	Greek	respondents	continue	to	view	the	euro	favorably	at	
the	time	of	writing	(Eurobarometer,	2016).	
We	focus	on	Greece	for	a	number	of	reasons:	not	only	has	this	country	experienced	
the	largest	fallout	from	the	crisis,	but	it	is	one	in	which	the	question	of	leaving	the	Eurozone	
is	no	longer	a	theoretical	question.	When	the	Greek	prime	minister	Alexis	Tsipras	organized	
a	referendum	in	July	2015	on	the	conditions	imposed	by	the	country’s	creditors	in	return	for	
further	 bailout	money,	 many	 believed	 that	 the	 referendum	was	 in	 fact	 a	 referendum	 on	
Greece’s	 continued	 membership	 in	 EMU	 (Walter	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Across	 Europe,	 many	
observers	believed	that	the	Greek	vote	against	the	bailout	package	would	lead	to	“Grexit,”	
Greece’s	 exit	 from	 the	 Eurozone.	 Within	 Greece,	 several	 Greek	 politicians,	 including	 the	
former	finance	minister	Yanis	Varoufakis,	and	(fringe)	political	parties	have	openly	called	for	
leaving	the	common	currency.	As	a	result,	the	question	of	keeping	the	euro	or	reintroducing	
a	national	currency	has	been	a	highly	salient	issue	in	Greek	politics.	The	public	debate	about	
this	issue	means	that	voters	are	likely	to	be	unusually	informed	about	the	issue	and	to	have	
strong	opinions	about.	
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We	 leverage	 this	 unique	 setting	 by	 using	 original	 survey	 data	 that	we	 collected	 in	
three	waves	 in	 Greece:	 the	 first	 survey	was	 conducted	 one	 day	 before	 the	 Greek	 bailout	
referendum	in	July	2015,	the	second	two	weeks	before	the	Greek	parliamentary	elections	in	
September	2015	and	the	third	wave	in	December	2015,	when	the	conditionality	agreed	on	in	
the	agreement	on	the	third	bailout	package	began	to	bite.	These	surveys	not	only	contain	
both	survey	experiments	about	the	trade-offs	inherent	in	the	euro-austerity	nexus	as	well	as	
a	detailed	battery	of	questions	designed	specifically	to	tap	all	the	many	explanations	given	in	
the	 literature	 and	 public	 debate	 for	 individual	 support	 of	 the	 common	 currency,	 but	 also	
allow	us	to	trace	developments	over	time.	As	a	result,	we	are	able	to	tease	out	the	different	
mechanisms	 explaining	 support	 for	 the	 euro	 and	 for	 Eurozone	 exit	 in	 this	 highly	 relevant	
case.	
	
Literature		
There	is	by	now	ample	evidence	that	in	the	euro	area,	public	support	for	the	euro	has	
remained	remarkably	strong	during	the	crisis,	even	though	support	for	the	EU	as	such	and	
trust	in	EU	institutions	has	declined	considerably	(Frieden,	2016;	Guiso	et	al.,	2016;	Hobolt	&	
Leblond,	2013;	Hobolt	&	Wratil,	 2015;	Roth	et	al.,	 2016).	Despite	 this	 resilience,	however,	
this	research	finds	that	the	crisis	has	changed	Europeans’	assessment	of	the	euro.		
Most	importantly,	existing	studies	suggest	that	material	considerations	have	become	
more	 important	 in	 influencing	 how	Europeans	 view	 the	 euro.3	 Although	 identity	 concerns	
continue	to	 influence	preferences	for	the	common	currency,	Hobolt	and	Wratil	 (2015)	find	
they	that	have	become	less	important	relative	to	utilitarian	concerns	over	the	course	of	the	
crisis.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 finding	 that	 higher	 unemployment	 rates	 have	 become	
associated	with	a	lower	net	support	for	the	euro	during	the	crisis,	whereas	this	relationship	
did	 not	 exist	 before	 the	 crisis	 (Roth	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 On	 the	 individual	 level,	 deteriorating	
expectations	 about	 the	 future	 personal	 job	 situation,	 household	 financial	 situation,	 and	
perception	 of	 the	 national	 employment	 situation	 lead	 to	 more	 disenchantment	 with	 the	
euro	(Guiso	et	al.,	2016).	In	the	end,	the	high	level	of	support	for	the	euro	might	thus	simply	
been	driven	by	the	fact	that	the	uncertainty	associated	with	the	consequences	of	exiting	the	
euro,	 or	 a	 Eurozone	 breakup	 more	 generally	 makes	 people	 cling	 to	 the	 status	 quo,	 and	
hence	the	euro	(Hobolt	&	Leblond,	2013).	
																																																						
3	For	a	dissenting	view,	arguing	that	ideological	concerns	dominate,	see	Bansak	et	al.	(Bansak	et	al.,	2016).	
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A	 few	 studies	 have	 taken	 a	 more	 detailed	 look	 into	 individual	 countries	 on	 this	
question.	 In	 Spain,	 for	 example,	 a	 country	 that	 has	 suffered	 considerably	 from	 the	 euro	
crisis,	Fernandez-Albertos	and	Kuo	(2016)	find	that	support	for	the	euro	is	significantly	lower	
among	 respondents	who	 have	 personally	 been	 negatively	 affected	 by	 the	 crisis,	 although	
they	are	in	fact	more	willing	to	accept	spending	cuts.	These	individuals	are	also	much	more	
likely	to	blame	the	common	currency	as	a	cause	of	the	crisis.	Overall,	however,	about	three	
quarters	 of	 Spaniards	 do	 not	 list	 EMU	 as	 one	 of	 the	 top	 three	 causes	 of	 the	 crisis,	 an	
observation	 that	 is	 curiously	at	odds	with	 the	 consensus	 view	among	economists	 that	 the	
common	 currency	 strongly	 contributed	 to	 the	 crisis	 (Baldwin	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Interestingly,	
almost	 half	 of	 the	 respondents	 showed	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 the	 unrealistic	 option	 of	
keeping	 the	euro	without	any	austerity	measures.	 Likewise,	 a	 survey	 conducted	 in	 Italy	 in	
2014	using	conjoint	analyses	found	that	Italians	are	highly	opposed	to	leaving	the	euro,	but	
are	at	the	same	time	unwilling	to	support	any	policies	needed	to	increase	the	sustainability	
of	 the	 common	 currency,	 including	 any	 changes	 in	 fiscal	 policy,	 giving	 more	 budgetary	
control	to	Brussels,	or	moving	some	fiscal	competences	to	the	EU	level.	(Franchino,	2014).	A	
study	about	Greece	reveals	equally	puzzling	responses,	with	objection	to	austerity	operating	
in	parallel	with	support	for	the	euro	(Clements	et	al.,	2014).	Karyotis	et	al.	(2014)	show	that	
at	 least	 in	 part,	 this	 seemingly	 perplexing	 configuration	 of	 preferences	 is	 fed	 by	 political	
elites.	As	the	authors	demonstrate,	in	July	2013,	when	they	were	still	in	opposition,	SYRIZA	
and	ANEL	MPs	were	much	more	in	favor	of	cutting	austerity	even	at	the	risk	of	leaving	the	
euro	than	when	this	suddenly	became	a	real	choice	for	them	in	the	summer	of	2015.	
Although	the	existing	research	has	contributed	in	highlighting	the	persistent	support	
for	the	euro	in	austerity-laden	countries,	we	still	lack	a	coherent	explanation	of	this	puzzle.	
This	 is	 mainly	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 the	 cross-national,	 mostly	 Eurobarometer-based,	
studies	are	very	useful	because	 they	allow	us	 to	 compare	 the	 support	pre-	and	post-crisis	
and	 allow	 for	 large-scale	 analyses	 across	 Eurozone	 and	 even	 EU	 countries.	 But	 these	
analyses	stay	at	a	rather	general	level	and	do	not	delve	deeply	into	why	support	for	the	euro	
remains	high,	especially	in	crisis	countries.	Second,	the	existing	focus	in	the	literature	lies	on	
preferences	 for	 the	 euro,	 without	 investigating	 how	 Europeans	 perceive	 the	 trade-off	
between	austerity	as	the	price	for	staying	in	the	common	currency.	The	studies	that	exist	on	
this	issue	(Fernández-Albertos	&	Kuo,	2016;	Franchino,	2014)	show	that	most	voters	want	to	
“have	 it	 all”:	 keep	 the	 euro	 and	 get	 rid	 of	 austerity.	 But	 given	 that	 this	 scenario	 is	 highly	
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unlikely,	 the	 question	 arises	 whether	 support	 for	 the	 euro	 will	 decrease	 when	 people	
increasingly	recognize	the	trade-off.	This	latter	point	is	a	really	important	one	for	the	future	
of	European	integration:	When	the	euro	was	founded,	it	was	clear	to	many,	including	many	
politicians,	 that	 crises	would	 happen	 and	would	 create	 huge	 pressures	 to	 push	 European	
integration	 further.	Yet,	 the	price	may	be	 so	high	 that	a	 complete	meltdown	also	appears	
possible	if	support	suddenly	collapses.		
	
Research	Design	
To	 unpack	 the	 determinants	 of	 euro-support	 in	 a	 context	 where	 the	 question	 of	
implementing	austerity	or	getting	out	of	the	euro	 is	a	highly	salient	 issue,	we	focus	on	the	
case	of	Greece.	Greece	 is	 the	country	 that	has	been	hit	hardest	by	 the	crisis,	and	also	 the	
only	 country	 that	 has	 actually	 been	 close	 to	 exiting	 EMU.	 Greece	 is	 hence	 a	 case	 where		
respondents	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 clear	 opinions	 on	 the	 euro	 and	 the	 tradeoffs	 involved	 in	
belonging	to	a	monetary	union.	At	the	same	time,	 it	 is	a	case	where	conventional	political	
economy	models	 would	 suggest	 that	 public	 opinion	 should	 have	 long	 turned	 against	 the	
common	currency	(e.g.	Simmons,	1994).		
To	study	public	opinion	towards	the	euro	in	Greece,	we	leverage	individual-level	data	
from	Greece,	 obtained	 from	 three	 original,	 nationwide	 CATI	 surveys,	 which	we	 fielded	 in	
cooperation	with	 y	 the	University	of	Macedonia’s	Research	 Institute	of	Applied	Social	 and	
Economic	 Studies	 in	 Thessaloniki	 (Greece)	 between	 July	 and	 December	 2015.	 4	 The	 first	
survey,	covering	989	respondents,	took	place	on	July	4,	2015,	just	one	day	before	the	Greek	
bailout	 referendum.	The	 second	 survey	of	1,018	 respondents	was	 fielded	on	September	7	
and	8,	2015,	 less	 than	 two	weeks	before	 the	Greek	September	20	parliamentary	election.	
Finally,	 the	 third	 survey	 was	 launched	 between	 2	 and	 6	 December	 2015,	 after	 the	 first	
austerity	 measures	 of	 the	 third	 bailout	 package	 had	 been	 implemented.	 Most	 of	 the	
information	 used	 in	 the	 paper	 comes	 from	 this	 third	 survey,	 which	 used	 a	 questionnaire	
tailored	to	examine	the	underlying	reasons	for	support	for	the	euro.	Apart	from	including	a	
long	 list	 of	 items	 to	 tap	 the	 different	 dimensions	 driving	 evaluations	 about	 the	 euro,	 the	
																																																						
4	In	the	first	stage	(cluster	sampling),	electoral	districts	were	chosen,	in	the	second	stage	(stratified	sampling)	
strata	within	each	cluster	were	identified	based	on	socioeconomic	characteristics	and	finally,	in	the	third	stage	
(SRS),	 a	 simple	 random	 sample	was	 drawn	within	 each	 stratum.	Because	 the	 interviews	were	 done	on	 fixed	
telephone	lines,	we	get	some	underrepresentation	of	the	youngest	respondents	and	an	overrepresentation	of	
female	respondents.	We	therefore	use	population	weights	in	our	analyses	to	match	the	basic	demographics	of	
the	Greek	population.	
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survey	also	accommodated	two	survey	experiments,	which	aimed	at	explicitly	capturing	the	
tradeoff	between	austerity	and	the	euro.		
Armed	with	these	data,	we	address	the	two	interrelated	questions	introduced	above.	
The	first	and	more	generic	question	relates	to	the	reasons	behind	the	high	rates	of	approval	
for	 the	 euro.	 The	 second	 relates	 to	 the	 tradeoff	 between	 staying	 the	 Eurozone	 and	
implementing	austerity.	How	elastic	is	support	for	the	EU	to	continuing	austerity	measures?	
We	start	with	 the	 first	question,	and	 first	assess	 the	distribution	of	perceptions	about	 the	
euro	among	 the	Greek	population,	 and	 then	move	on	 to	use	 these	 items	as	predictors	of	
euro	preferences.	We	 also	 explore	more	 in	 detail	which	mechanisms	 are	more	 salient	 for	
those	that	perceive	themselves	to	be	particularly	affected	by	austerity		
In	the	second	part	we	develop	this	latter	point	further	and	analyse	how	respondents	
respond	to	the	austerity-Grexit	trade-off.	We	investigate	how	an	increasing	appreciation	of	
this	trade-off	affects	euro	preferences	across	time	and	across	experimental	treatments.	Our	
particular	interest	lies	in	the	group	of	cross-pressured	respondents,	experiencing	already	the	
consequences	of	austerity	via	a	significant	reduction	in	their	income,	while	in	the	same	time	
anticipating	high	losses	under	a	Grexit	scenario.		
This	 strategy	 allows	 us	 to	 tease	 out	 the	 different	 mechanisms	 and	 to	 examine	
support	for	the	euro.	In	this	respect,	this	work	extends	recent	evidence	on	how	the	crisis	has	
boosted	the	levels	of	Euroscepticism	in	Greece	(Freire	et	al.,	2014;	Verney,	2015)	and	how	it	
has	 decreased	 trust	 in	 EU	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 ECB	 (Roth	 et	 al.	 2014,	 Ehrmann	 et	 al.	
2013,	Wälti,	2012).	Rather	than	looking	at	the	over	time	change	in	support	for	the	euro,	we	
try	to	unpack	the	reasons	for	its	support,	while	focusing	on	the	tradeoff	between	staying	in	
the	Eurozone	and	perpetuating	austerity.	
	
Why	do	Europeans	in	the	Eurozone	want	to	keep	the	euro?		
To	 understand	why	 so	many	 Europeans	 continue	 to	 view	 the	 euro	 favorably	 after	
years	of	austerity	and	crisis,	we	can	draw	on	a	large	body	of	research	that	has	investigated	
why	 some	 people	 view	 the	 common	 currency	more	 favorably	 than	 others.	 This	 research,	
which	 largely	 originates	 in	 the	 years	 before	 the	 crisis,	 has	 suggested	 that	 support	 for	 the	
Eurozone	is	determined	by	four	broad	categories	of	considerations.5	Which	ones	dominate	
																																																						
5	Attitudes	towards	the	euro	currency	seem	to	have	been	more	closely	linked	to	overall	attitudes	towards	the	
EU	before	the	crisis.	After	the	crisis,	however,	evaluations	of	the	two	institutions	seem	to	be	less	attached	to	
each	other	(for	early	and	more	recent	work	on	euro	attitudes	see	Banducci	et	al.,	2003,	2009,	Brettschneider	et	
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during	the	euro	crisis	and	drive	the	continuously	high	support	for	the	common	currency	in	a	
time	 when	 trust	 and	 confidence	 in	 the	 EU	 as	 such	 is	 declining,	 is	 an	 empirical	 question,	
however.	
Material	interests.	 The	 first	 determinant	 of	 euro	 preferences	 is	 individuals’	
material	 interest.	 Put	 simply,	 those	 who	 anticipate	 greater	 financial	 losses	 as	 a	 result	 of	
exchange-rate	volatility	are	more	likely	to	oppose	to	it	and	thus	they	are	also	more	likely	to	
favor	a	common	currency.	Generally,	individuals	who	work	in	tradable	sectors	(Gabel	2000)	
or	that	have	higher	levels	of	human	capital	and	financial	assets	(Banducci	et	al.,	2003;	Gabel	
&	Hix,	 2005)	 have	 been	more	 supportive	 of	 the	 euro,	 as	 they	 tend	 to	 benefit	more	 from	
monetary	integration.	It	is	important	to	note	that	economic	self-interest	appears	to	be	more	
important	for	EMU	than	for	other	pillars	of	the	EU	integration.	In	addition	to	these	personal	
economic	concerns,	national-level	economic	factors	and	collective	utilitarian	considerations	
also	play	a	role.	Many	pre-crisis	studies	of	support	for	the	euro	show	that,	beyond	individual	
features,	perceptions	about	inflation	and	the	strength	of	the	currency,	as	well	as	exchange	
rate	fluctuations,	correlate	strongly	with	support	for	the	common	currency	(Banducci	et	al.,	
2009;	 Hobolt	 &	 Leblond,	 2009).	 Kaltenthaler	 and	 Anderson	 (2001)	 argue	 that	 individuals	
project	the	costs	and	benefits	of	euro-membership	by	making	sociotropic	evaluations	of	the	
economic	impact	of	the	common	currency	on	their	country.	
Not	surprisingly,	and	as	discussed	above,	material	interests	have	also	been	shown	to	
influence	euro	preferences	during	the	crisis	(e.g.,	Guiso	et	al.,	2016;	Hobolt	&	Wratil,	2015;	
Roth	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 For	 example,	 Spanish	mortgage	 holders	 and	 high-income	 earners	 have	
been	 found	 to	 view	 keeping	 the	 euro	 better	 than	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 national	 currency	
(Fernández-Albertos	 &	 Kuo,	 2016).	 Likewise,	 during	 the	 Greek	 bailout	 referendum,	 high	
income	earners	and	older	voters,	who	have	benefitted	more	from	the	euro	and	been	hurt	
relatively	less	from	austerity,	were	much	more	likely	to	vote	for	austerity	(i.e.,	the	proposed	
bailout	package)	than	reject	it	despite	the	risk	that	this	might	lead	to	Grexit.	In	contrast,	the	
“No”	option	was	majoritarian	among	 the	young	cohorts,	which	are	 likely	 to	have	 invested	
less	in	the	euro	and	have	been	hurt	particularly	hard	by	austerity	(Walter	et	al.,	2016).	
National	identity.		 Non-economic	 factors	 are	 also	 pivotal.	 National	 identity	 and	
general	 attitudes	 towards	 European	 integration	 can	 be	 as	 powerful	 in	 explaining	 public	
support	 for	 the	euro	 (Banducci	et	al.,	2009).	National	 identity	and	attachment	 to	 the	own	
																																																																																																																																																																									
al.,	2003,	Deroose	et	al.,	2007,	Gärtner,	1997,	Guiso	et	al.,	2014,	Hobolt	and	Leblond,	2009,	2014,	Hobolt	and	
Wratil,	2015,	Kaltenthaler	and	Anderson,	2001).	
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country	 tends	 to	 be	 a	 powerful	 explanatory	 factor	 of	 rejection	 of	 monetary	 integration		
(Hooghe	and	Marks	2004)(McLaren,	2006)	and	citizens	who	thought	that	the	EU	undermined	
national	 sovereignty	 and	democracy	were	more	 likely	 to	 vote	 against	 the	 euro’s	 adoption	
(Hobolt,	2009;	Hobolt	&	Leblond,	2009).	Jupille	and	Leblang	(2007)	argue	that	these	identity	
and	 attitudinal	 explanations	 play	 a	 stronger	 role	 in	 explaining	 support	 for	 the	 euro	 than	
individual	material	interests.	
These	two	factors	–material	 interests	and	identity/attitudes-	have	been	persistently	
found	 to	 simultaneously	 explain	 support	 for	 the	 euro.	However,	Hobolt	 and	Wratil	 (2015)	
claim	that	the	outburst	of	the	economic	crisis	has	changed	the	balance	between	economic	
and	identity	explanations,	becoming	the	former	more	relevant	and	the	latter	less	important.	
Because	the	recent	economic	crisis	and	the	institutionalisation	of	austerity	has	increased	the	
costs	of	 euro	membership	 for	many	 citizens,	 they	argue	 that	 voters’	 cost-benefit	 analyses	
are	now	more	relevant	than	in	the	past	to	explain	whether	they	want	monetary	integration	
or	 not.	 The	 asymmetric	 impact	 of	 the	 crisis	might	 have	 also	 changed	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	
economic	calculus	of	some	voters.	
Ideology	 Another	 factor	 that	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 ideology.	
Positive	attitudes	towards	the	EU	more	generally	have	been	found	to	translate	into	support	
for	 monetary	 integration	 (Banducci	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Since	 EMU	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	
European	integration	project,	 it	 is	 logical	to	expect	that	people’s	perceptions	about	the	EU	
are	associated	with	their	evaluations	of	the	euro.	This	should	be	particularly	pronounced	in	
times	of	crisis,	because	leaving	the	euro-zone	(as	opposed	to	not	joining)	is	often	treated	as	
a	first	step	towards	the	exit	from	the	EU.	Indeed,	Euroskepticism	appears	a	strong	predictor	
of	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 euro	 during	 the	 crisis,	 whereas	 positive	 views	 of	 EU	
membership	help	 to	also	 retain	high	 levels	of	 support	 for	 the	EMU	 (Fernández-Albertos	&	
Kuo,	 2016).	 Left-right	 predispositions	 also	 seem	 to	 be	 particularly	 important	 in	 explaining	
variation	in	the	reaction	among	European	publics.	As	Bansak	et	al.	show	(2016),	the	left-right	
division	predicts	support	for	the	bailout	packages	the	EU	has	signed	with	Greece	remarkably	
well.	The	mechanism	driving	this	division	is	difference	in	expectations	of	what	a	Grexit	would	
imply	 for	 the	 euro-zone.	 For	 the	 left,	 Grexit	 would	 pose	 a	 significant	 threat	 to	 the	 EU	
framework,	whereas	for	the	right	it	would	signal	a	transformation	in	the	European	economy	
that	would	render	it	more	competitive	in	the	global	market.	 	
	 11	
Institutional	Constraints:	 Finally,	 a	 last	 strand	 of	 explanations	 focuses	 on	 the	
political	benefits	of	belonging	 to	 the	euro.	Because	sharing	a	common	currency	constrains	
national	macroeconomic	room	to	maneuver,	it	serves	as	a	commitment	device	for	national	
politicians.	 This	 explanation	 has	 been	 popular	 in	 relation	with	 the	 European	Union.	 In	 EU	
post-communist	countries,	 those	more	dissatisfied	with	their	national	democracy	and	with	
lower	levels	of	political	trust	are	more	likely	to	support	monetary	integration	into	the	euro	
(Allam	 &	 Goerres,	 2011).	 More	 generally,	 citizens	 that	 have	 worse	 opinions	 about	 their	
national	 political	 institutions	will	 be	more	 likely	 to	 be	 supportive	 of	 European	 institutions	
(Sanchez-Cuenca	2000).	This	can	explain	the	traditional	high	levels	of	enthusiasm	for	the	EU	
in	Southern	European	countries	that	had	late	transitions	to	democracy,	where	corruption	is	
higher	and	low	trust	to	national	politicians	has	been	more	widespread.		
This	 argument	 has	 been	 revisited	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 euro-crisis,	 attributing	
persistent	 support	 for	 EMU	 to	 the	 widespread	 view	 that	 EMU,	 like	 the	 EU	 in	 general,	
generates	 an	 institutional	 framework	 helps	 to	 mediate	 corruption	 and	 increase	
administrative	efficiency	 in	domestic	 institutions.	Guiso	et	al.	 (2016)	show	that	support	for	
euro	 is	 higher	 in	 countries	whose	 governments’	 are	 perceived	 by	 their	 citizens	 to	 be	 less	
effective	than	Germany	and	in	those	countries	in	which	corruption	is	high	and	citizens	think	
that	 this	 government	 is	unable	 to	 control	 it.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	but	with	 regards	 to	Eastern	
European	countries	that	joined	the	EU,	but	are	not	members	of	the	Eurozone.		
In	sum,	past	research	suggests	several	reasons	why	the	euro	remains	popular	even	in	
crisis-afflicted	 countries.	 Yet	 it	 is	 less	 clear	which	one	of	 these	 four	 sets	of	 explanations	–	
material	 interests,	 national	 identity,	 ideology,	 or	 institutional	 constraints	 –	 are	 likely	 to	
matter	most.	We	approach	this	question	as	an	empirical	question	and	use	our	survey	data	to	
explore	 which	 of	 these	 explanations	 matter	 most	 in	 explaining	 Greek	 perceptions	 of	 the	
euro.	
	
Operationalization	
The	approach	we	follow	is	to	test	these	different	explanations	of	support	for	the	euro	
through	a	battery	of	questions	designed	specifically	 to	tap	these	factors	that	we	fielded	 in	
the	December	2015	survey.	In	particular,	we	used	a	five-point	Likert	scale	to	ask	the	degree	
of	agreements	with	a	series	of	statements	about	the	euro	(in	a	scale	from	1-fully	disagree-	to	
	 12	
5-fully	agree).	These	statements	directly	measure	how	respondents’	respond	to	explanations	
that	are	based	on	each	of	the	explanations	suggested	by	the	literature.		
To	 gauge	 material	 interest,	 and	 as	 a	 way	 of	 capturing	 pocketbook	 economic	
perceptions,	 we	 ask	whether	 respondents	 expect	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 their	 personal	
income	if	Greece	leaves	the	euro	(Less	Income)	and	whether	they	expect	less	austerity	(Less	
Austerity)	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Grexit.	 Moreoever,	 we	 also	 ask	 them	 to	 assess	 the	 long-term	
financial	 impact	of	Grexit,	by	using	the	following	 item:	“In	 the	 long-run,	my	 income	will	be	
more	stable	if	Greece	stays	in	the	Eurozone.”	(Stable).	Sociotropic	economic	perceptions	are	
captured	 by	 the	 following	 statement:	 “The	 fact	 that	 Greece	 grew	 strongly	 in	 the	 years	
following	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 euro	 shows	 that	 the	 euro	 is	 good	 for	 Greece.”	 To	 tap	
identity	 explanations,	 we	 asked	 respondents	 whether	 they	 think	 that	 being	 part	 of	 the	
Eurozone	is	a	signal	that	Greece	is	also	 in	the	heart	of	Europe	(Heart	Europe).	We	also	ask	
whether	 they	think	that	 leaving	the	euro	signifies	 the	beginning	of	 the	country’s	exit	 from	
the	EU	 (End	EU),	which	captures	 the	concern	about	domino	effects	 in	 the	event	of	Grexit.	
Institutional	explanations	are	tested	by	asking	respondents	if	they	agree	with	the	following	
two	 statements:	 “Without	 pressure	 from	 the	 European	 institutions,	 the	Greek	 government	
would	not	be	 implementing	any	 reforms”	 (Reform)	 and	“Being	part	of	 the	Eurozone	 forces	
Greek	 policymakers	 to	 act	 more	 responsibly.”	 (Responsible).	 Finally,	 we	 add	 a	 fifth	
explanation,	that	has	only	become	relevant	during	the	crisis:	The	role	of	uncertainty	about	
the	consequences	of	Grexit.	We	use	the	following	item:	“Keeping	the	euro	is	best	for	Greece	
because	no	one	knows	what	would	happen	if	Greece	left	the	euro.”	(Uncertainty)			
We	 turn	 all	 these	 variables	 into	 dummy	 variables,	 where	 they	 take	 value	 1	 if	 the	
respondent	 fully	 agrees	with	 the	 statement.	 See	 Table	 A.1	 of	 for	 a	 full	 representation	 of	
these	statements	and	their	corresponding	variable	in	our	models.		
	
Results	
Figure	1	gives	an	overview	about	the	responses	to	the	different	statements	about	the	
euro,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 question	 on	 whether	 Greece	 should	 keep	 the	 euro	 or	 not	 from	 the	
December	 survey.	 The	 first	 thing	 that	 springs	 to	 attention	 is	 that	 the	 euro	 still	 enjoys	 a	
considerable	 support	 among	 the	 Greeks,	 despite	 the	 crisis	 and	 the	 harsh	 austerity	 in	 the	
country.	 In	our	survey,	we	asked	what	 individuals	thought	was	best	for	Greece’s	future:	to	
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stay	 in	 the	 euro	 or	 to	 adopt	 a	 national	 currency.	 A	 clear	majority	 of	 about	 two	 thirds	 of	
respondents	(65%)	opted	for	keeping	the	euro.	
Despite	 this	 clear	 verdict,	 figure	 1	 also	 shows	 considerable	 variation	 in	 support	 for	
the	different	explanations	given	for	this	strong	support.	Descriptively,	we	can	see	that	four	
explanations	 garner	 very	 strong	 support	 in	 the	 Greek	 population.	 The	 most	 widespread	
perception	 is	 that	 Grexit	 would	 entail	 a	 reduction	 of	 personal	 income	 (62	 %	 of	 the	
population	 agree	with	 that	 statement).	Moreover,	 a	 clear	majority	 of	 respondents	 agrees	
that	 Greece	 would	 not	 implement	 the	 necessary	 reforms	 without	 pressure	 from	 the	
European	 institutions,	 that	 Grexit	 would	 be	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 end	 of	 Greece’s	 EU	
membership,	and	 that	Greece	should	keep	 the	euro	given	 the	uncertainty	associated	with	
any	other	option.		
	
Figure1:	Respondents	 strongly	 agreeing/disagreeing	with	different	 statements	 about	 the	
euro	
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Other	statements	are,	however,	much	more	contested.	Only	15%	of	the	Greeks	think	
that	 there	would	 be	 less	 austerity	 if	 the	 exited	 the	 Eurozone,	whereas	 almost	 half	 of	 the	
respondents	believe	this	to	be	false.	The	optimistic	respondents	are	mostly	extreme	left	or	
right	voters	that	voted	for	ANEL	Golden	Dawn,	or	KKE	in	September6.	Likewise,	the	symbolic	
benefits	 of	 being	 in	 the	 euro,	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 being	 part	 of	 the	 heart	 Europe,	 and	 the	
memories	of	 the	growth	period	as	a	positive	consequence	of	 the	euro	are	also	arguments	
not	so	established	in	the	electorate	and	less	than	40%	of	the	electorate	fully	agrees	with	the	
corresponding	statements.	
We	are	also	interested,	however,	in	exploring	the	extent	to	which	these	statements	
can	explain	support	for	the	euro	in	the	current	crisis	situation	in	Greece.	To	do	so,	we	run	a	
series	 of	 logit	 models,	 where	 the	 dependent	 variable	 is	 currency	 preference	 (1-	 Greece	
should	stay	 in	 the	euro;	0:	Greece	should	adopt	a	national	currency).	Each	model	 includes	
one	of	the	variables	of	table	A.1	turned	into	a	dummy,	alongside	a	set	of	control	variables7.	
We	also	add	some	models	that	include	variables	relevant	to	the	potential	explanations,	but	
that	 are	 not	 explicitly	 about	 the	 euro:	 Left	 (which	 takes	 value	 1	 if	 the	 individual	 places	
himself	 in	 a	 10	 point	 ideological	 scale	 below	 5),	Nationalism	 (which	 takes	 value	 1	 if	 the	
individual	 fully	 agrees	 with	 the	 statement	 “Contemporary	 Greeks	 are	 successors	 of	 the	
inglorious	ancient	Greek	civilization“),	Unification	 (which	captures	whether	 the	respondent	
agrees	with	the	statement	that	EU	unification	has	gone	too	far).	This	is	a	typical	measure	of	
attachment	to	the	EU.	Figure	2	plots	the	coefficients	for	each	of	the	variables.		
We	find	that	most	of	the	potential	explanations	taken	by	themselves	are	statistically	
significant	and	explain	the	support	for	the	euro	to	some	extent.	However,	when	we	compare	
them	to	each	other,	some	of	the	very	common	arguments	among	the	Greek	public	are	not	
so	decisive	in	explaining	an	individual’s	support	for	the	support.	For	instance,	the	argument	
that	 Greece	 needs	 the	 pressure	 of	 European	 institutions	 to	 implement	 the	 necessary	
reforms	 is	 very	 popular	 in	 the	 Greek	 debate,	 but	 believing	 this	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 as	
decisive	to	explain	whether	someone	supports	the	euro	or	thinks	that	Greece	should	adopt	a	
national	currency.	
																																																						
6	Perhaps	surprisingly,	only	15%	of	Syriza	voters	fully	agree	with	this	statement,	which	is	the	same	proportion	
than	in	the	general	population.	This	possibly	means	that	Syriza’s	efforts	to	justify	their	final	agreement	with	the	
Troika,	which	initially	was	rejected	by	most	of	their	voters	in	the	Referendum	on	July	5th,	have	been	successful	
in	shaping	the	public’s	perception	as	the	best	of	all	alternatives.	
7	We	control	for	age,	gender,	education,	type	of	region	(urban/rural),	evaluation	of	the	government,	and	party	
voted	in	the	September	2015	election.	
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Among	 the	 most	 relevant	 factors	 explaining	 support	 for	 the	 euro	 in	 the	 general	
population	 appears	 to	 be	 risk-aversion	 considerations.	 Believing	 that	 Greece	 faces	 many	
uncertainties	 outside	 the	 Eurozone,	 is	 the	 strongest	 reason	 for	many	 voters	 to	 prefer	 the	
euro	 against	 a	 national	 currency.	 Likewise,	 the	 perception	 that	 incomes	 are	 more	 stable	
within	the	Eurozone	is	also	on	of	the	most	relevant	explanations.	And	only	the	minority	of	
those,	who	 believe	 that	 leaving	 the	 Eurozone	would	 be	 associated	with	 less	 austerity	 are	
more	likely	to	favor	an	exit	from	the	common	currency.	These	three	explanatory	facts	point	
to	the	security	of	the	Eurozone,	despite	the	cost	in	terms	of	austerity	that	we	will	analyze	in	
more	detail	below,	against	the	 leap	in	the	dark	that	Grexit	could	mean	as	one	of	the	main	
reasons	why	support	for	the	euro	has	remained	high	in	Greece.	In	addition,	the	perception	
that	growth	in	the	past	was	a	consequence	of	the	euro	is	not	a	prevalent	perception	in	the	
Greek	population,	but	those	that	believe	so	are	very	likely	to	still	support	the	euro	today.			
	
Figure	2:	Beta	coefficients	of	perceptions	about	the	euro	(Logit	models,	DV:	Preference	to	
stay	in	the	euro)	
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How	does	austerity	affect	support	for	the	euro?	
The	 last	 section	 showed	 that	 the	 euro	 continues	 to	 enjoy	 considerable	 support	 in	
Greece.	This	is	a	surprising	finding	in	light	of	the	severity	of	the	crisis	the	country	has	gone	
through,	but	less	of	a	surprise	if	one	considers	our	finding	that	the	euro’s	appeal	stems	not	
only	from	material	considerations	but	more	from	risk	aversion	and,	for	those	vulnerable	to	
the	 austerity	 implemented	 through	 the	 MoU,	 political	 and	 institutional	 considerations.	
Nonetheless,	the	severity	of	the	crisis	and	the	fact	that	key	problems	underlying	the	Greek	
crisis	remain	unresolved,	a	question	of	equal	theoretical	and	practical	relevance	is	whether	
this	high	level	of	support	for	the	euro	in	Greece	is	sustainable.	
This	 question	 is	 relevant	 in	 theoretical	 terms,	 because	 the	 strong	 support	 for	 the	
common	 currency	 is	 surprising	 in	 light	 of	 previous	 research	 on	 fixed	 exchange-rates,	 that	
shows	 that	 voters	 tend	 to	 prefer	 the	 ability	 to	 target	 domestic	 economic	 problems	 over	
exchange-rate	 stability	 (Bearce	&	Hallerberg,	 2011;	 Sattler	&	Walter,	 2010).	 Past	 research	
has	 shown	 that	 this	 preference	 is	 particularly	 strong	 in	 times	 of	 crisis,	where	 the	 policies	
required	to	sustain	a	 fixed	exchange	rate	usually	come	at	 the	cost	of	high	unemployment,	
fiscal	 austerity	 and	 painful	 structural	 reforms	 (Eichengreen,	 1996;	 Simmons,	 1994).	 Under	
these	circumstances,	countries	facing	serious	crises	 in	the	past	have	only	opted	to	retain	a	
fixed	exchange-rate	regime	when	it	was	relatively	easy	for	them	economically	and	politically	
to	 implement	 the	 alternative	 to	 devaluation	 (Walter,	 2013).	 This	 alternative,	 a	 strategy	
called	“internal	devaluation”	or	“internal	adjustment,”	 implies	that	austerity	and	structural	
reforms	 are	 implemented	 to	 depress	 prices	 and	 to	 regain	 competitiveness	 (Shambaugh,	
2012).	The	theoretically	 interesting	question	is,	how	people	trade-off	the	costs	of	austerity	
and	devaluation	and	where	the	breaking	point	is	when	both	the	costs	of	internal	adjustment	
(i.e.,	 austerity	 and	 structural	 reforms)	 and	 the	 costs	 of	 external	 adjustment	 (i.e.,	 a	
devaluation	 of	 the	 currency)	 are	 very	 high,	 such	 as	 in	most	 of	 the	 crisis	 countries	 in	 the	
Eurozone	(Walter,	2016).		
The	question	about	the	sustainability	of	euro-support	 in	Greece	also	carries	a	 lot	of	
practical	relevance,	because	it	is	directly	related	to	the	probability	of	“Grexit,”	and	hence	the	
possibility	of	a	breakup	of	the	Eurozone.	Being	part	of	a	monetary	union	has	made	the	Greek	
crisis	 experience	 much	 harsher	 and	 more	 difficult	 than	 normal,	 given	 that	 the	 standard	
response	 to	 similar	 debt	 and	 balance-of-payments	 crises	 –	 devaluation,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	
degree	default	–	are	not	available	in	a	currency	union	(e.g.,	Frieden	&	Walter,	2017;	Stiglitz,	
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2016).	The	main	reasons	for	this	policy	path,	which	in	other	circumstances	would	probably	
be	considered	as	suicidal,	have	been	that	the	costs	of	leaving	the	eurozone	are	likely	to	be	
huge	for	any	member	of	the	common	currency	(Eichengreen,	2010)	and	that	public	support	
for	the	euro	has	been	very	strong	throughout	the	crisis.	But	as	the	costs	of	austerity-driven	
crisis	resolution	within	the	EMU-context	mounts	and	without	much	hope	for	a	considerable	
improvement	 in	 the	Greek	 economy	 in	 the	 near-to-medium	 future,	 the	 question	whether	
there	is	a	breaking	point	in	which	the	political	and	economic	costs	of	staying	in	the	Eurozone	
outweigh	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 costs	 of	 leaving	 (O'Rourke	 &	 Taylor,	 2013).	 Because	
public	 opinion	 is	 going	 to	 be	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 political	 costs	 of	 such	 a	 move,	
understanding	 how	Greeks	 view	 the	 austerity-Grexit	 trade-off	 is	 central	 to	 gauging	 to	 the	
risk	of	a	Eurozone	breakup.	
To	 investigate	 this	 question,	 we	 proceed	 in	 three	 steps.	 First,	 we	 take	 a	 temporal	
perspective	 and	 analyze	 how	 public	 opinion	 has	 evolved	 during	 a	 time	 period	where	 the	
austerity-Grexit	 trade-off	 became	 particularly	 transparent.	 Second,	 we	 leverage	
experimental	 evidence	 about	 this	 trade-off.	 Both	 analyses	 show	 that	 Greeks	 become	 less	
supportive	of	 the	euro	as	 they	become	more	aware	 that	 the	cost	of	 staying	 in	 the	euro	 is	
more	austerity.	Third,	we	look	at	individual	expectations	and	vulnerability	profiles	and	show	
that	 most	 Greeks	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 both	 austerity	 and	 Grexit,	 making	 crisis	 resolution	
particularly	painful	and	politically	difficult.		
	
Euro	Support	over	time	
Our	three	public	opinion	surveys	cover	a	phase	 in	the	Greek	crisis	during	which	the	
austerity-Grexit	trade-off	became	particularly	transparent	(July-December	2015).	In	January	
2015,	Alexis	Tsipras	and	his	populist	 left	party	SYRIZA	had	won	the	elections	on	a	platform	
that	promised	to	end	austerity	while	keeping	Greece	in	the	Eurozone.	True	to	this	promise,	
the	 government	 engaged	 in	 negotiations	with	 the	 international	 and	 European	 institutions	
overseeing	Greece’s	bailout	program	to	renegotiate	the	terms	of	the	bailout	program.	When	
these	negotiations	failed	to	result	in	meaningful	debt	relief	and	an	easing	of	conditionality,	
Tsipras	played	his	hand	to	the	fullest	and	called	a	referendum	on	the	bailout	package	in	the	
hope	of	forcing	creditors	to	agree	to	a	package	that	would	lead	to	less	austerity	in	Greece.	
Hopes	were	high	 in	Greece	 that	 a	 vote	 against	 the	existing	bailout	package	would	 indeed	
achieve	 this	 goal.	 Even	 though	 many	 observers	 and	 policymakers	 in	 Greece	 and	 abroad	
	 18	
warned	 that	a	vote	against	 the	package	would	 lead	 to	Greece’s	exit	 from	the	Eurozone,	a	
majority	of	voters	believed	that	a	no-vote	would	not	endanger	Greece’s	membership	in	EMU	
but	would	instead	improve	the	country’s	bargaining	position	(Walter	et	al.,	2016).		
Given	 the	widespread	belief,	 that	Greece’s	Eurozone	membership	and	an	easing	of	
austerity	were	 not	 incompatible,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 support	 for	 the	 euro	was	 strong	
among	 the	Greek	public	on	 the	eve	of	 the	bailout	 referendum.	 Figure	4	 shows	 that	 going	
into	the	referendum	(our	poll	was	conducted	on	July	4,	one	day	before	the	referendum),	a	
large	majority	of	 three	quarters	of	our	 respondents	 stated	 that	 if	 they	could	 choose,	 they	
would	want	to	keep	the	euro	and	stay	in	the	EU.	
	
Figure	 4:	 Development	 of	 attitudes	 towards	 Eurozone	 and	 EU	 membership,	 July	 -	
December	2015	
	
	
But	over	 the	 following	months	 this	 support	 fell	 considerably.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising,	
because	 the	aftermath	of	 the	 referendum	made	 it	 clear	 that	 there	was	 in	 fact	 a	 trade-off	
between	austerity	and	Grexit.	In	the	post-referendum	negotiations,	Greece	had	to	agree	to	a	
third	bailout	package	that	included	once	more	harsh	austerity	measures.	The	alternative	to	
accepting	 these	 terms,	 it	 became	 very	 clear,	was	Greece’s	 exit	 from	 the	 Eurozone.	 Faced	
with	this	experience,	support	for	the	euro	declined	by	10	percentage	points	within	only	six	
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months,	even	though	a	majority	continued	to	support	EMU	membership	(see	figure	4).	This	
suggests	that	as	the	tradeoff	became	more	obvious,	the	euro	became	more	unpopular.	
	
Experimental	evidence	about	the	austerity-Grexit	trade-off	
Second,	we	ran	a	survey	experiment	in	the	July	and	December	survey	waves	designed	
to	 examine	 how	 voters	 respond	 when	 explicitly	 confronted	 with	 the	 Austerity-Grexit	
tradeoff.	For	this	purpose,	we	randomly	assigned	respondents	into	three	groups.	The	control	
group	 was	 asked	 “Personally,	 which	 of	 the	 following	 do	 you	 think	 is	 best	 for	 Greece’s	
future?”	 In	 the	 two	 treatment	 groups,	 we	 added	 information	 that	 staying	 in	 the	 euro	
required	more	austerity,	and	varied	the	time	frame	for	that	austerity.	Specifically,	treatment	
one	 read	 “Observers	 say	 that	 staying	 in	 the	 euro	 requires	 more	 pension	 cuts	 and	 tax	
increases	 for	 the	next	months.	 Personally,	which	of	 the	 following	do	 you	 think	 is	 best	 for	
Greece’s	 future?”,	 whereas	 Treatment	 2	 took	 a	 medium-term	 perspective	 and	 stated	
“Observers	say	that	staying	in	the	euro	requires	more	pension	cuts	and	tax	increases	for	the	
next	4-5	years.	Personally,	which	of	the	following	do	you	think	is	best	for	Greece’s	future?”	
All	 respondents	 had	 to	 choose	 from	 the	 same	 answer	 categories:	 “Stay	 in	 the	 euro”	 or	
“adopt	a	national	currency.”	
	
Figure	5:	Survey	Experiment	about	the	Austerity-Grexit	Tradeoff,	July	and	December	2015	
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Figure	5	and	Table	1	show	the	results	of	the	survey	experiment	for	the	July	and	the	
December	 waves.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 temporal	 evidence	 we	 presented,	 we	 find	 that	 overall	
support	for	the	euro	was	significantly	lower	in	December	2015	than	before	the	referendum	
in	 July	2015.	Nonetheless,	 in	both	waves	 those	 respondents	 that	 received	 the	 information	
that	 the	 cost	 of	 keeping	 the	 euro	was	 either	months	 (T1)	 or	 4-5	 years	 (T2)	 of	more	 fiscal	
austerity,	were	less	likely	to	support	the	euro.		
	
Table	 1:	 Effects	 of	 the	 austerity-Grexit	 experiment	 on	 preferences	 for	 keeping	 the	 euro	
(logit	analyses)	
		 JULY	
	
		
	
DECEMBER	
	  		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)				 	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Treatment	1:	months	 -0.162	 -0.159	 -0.238				
	
-0.284	 -0.275	 -0.167				
		 (0.211)	 (0.216)	 (0.228)				
	
(0.175)	 (0.180)	 (0.187)				
Treatment	2:	years	 -0.311	 -0.354*	 -0.511**		
	
-0.252	 -0.224	 -0.165				
		 (0.209)	 (0.213)	 (0.228)				
	
(0.176)	 (0.181)	 (0.188)				
Age	
	
0.273***	 0.188***	
	  
0.024***	 0.021***	
		
	
(0.065)	 (0.065)				
	  
(0.005)	 (0.006)				
Education	Level	
	
0.034	 0.017				
	  
0.171***	 0.167***	
		
	
(0.096)	 (0.050)				
	  
(0.053)	 (0.058)				
Female	
	
-0.070	 -0.026				
	  
-0.239	 -0.150				
		
	
(0.172)	 (0.183)				
	  
(0.147)	 (0.155)				
No-Vote	Referendum	
	  
-1.713***	
	   
-1.389***	
		
	  
(0.208)				
	   
(0.157)				
Constant	 1.292***	 0.185	 1.739***	
	
0.828***	 -1.053**	 -0.204				
		 (0.157)	 (0.657)	 (0.503)				
	
(0.128)	 (0.457)	 (0.493)				
		
	  
		
	    Observations	 989	 989	 989				 	 1050	 1049	 1049				
F	 1.107	 4.653	 14.839	
	
1.539	 6.395	 17.274	
Note:	Data	are	weighted.	Dependent	variable	is	a	dummy	variable	coded	1	if	respondent	would	like	to	stay	in	
the	Eurozone.	
	
There	are	also	some	interesting	differences	between	the	results	from	the	July	and	the	
December	waves.	Most	 importantly,	 although	 the	 treatments	 have	 the	 expected	 negative	
effect	in	all	cases,	only	the	strong	trade-off	treatment	(focusing	on	years)	had	a	statistically	
significant	effect	on	euro	preferences	after	controlling	for	demographics,	and	only	in	the	July	
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survey.	 One	 possible	 explanation	 is	 that	 as	 the	 trade-off	 became	 widely	 apparent	
throughout	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2015	 in	 Greece,	 a	 simple	 framing	 experiment	 became	 too	
weak	to	influence	preferences	on	this	highly	salient	and	widely	discussed	topic.	
	
Individual	vulnerability	profiles	and	ways	forward	
How	do	individuals	perceive	the	austerity-Grexit	trade-off	in	terms	of	their	personal	
economic	situation?	Past	research	(Walter	2013,	2016)	has	shown	that	the	costs	of	austerity	
vs	 costs	 of	 devaluation	 (in	 Greece’s	 case,	 euro	 exit)	 are	 not	 distributed	 equally	 across	
societies	 and	 that	 the	 relative	 costs	 of	 these	measures	matter	 a	 great	 deal	 in	 influencing	
individual’s	 preferences	 about	 different	 crisis	 resolution	 strategies.	 The	 preferred	 crisis	
resolution	 strategy	 is	 clear	 for	 those	 individuals	 who	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 only	 one	 type	 of	
adjustment:	those	vulnerable	to	austerity,	but	not	to	euro	exit	will	prefer	the	latter,	and	vice	
versa.	
For	 those	 individuals,	 however,	 who	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 both,	 the	 situation	 is	much	
more	difficult.	These	individuals	find	themselves	between	a	rock	and	a	hard	place:	No	matter	
how	the	government	tries	to	resolve	the	crisis,	they	will	be	hurt.	Crisis	resolution	in	countries	
where	a	majority	of	voters	exhibits	such	a	“vulnerability	profile”	tends	to	particularly	painful	
and	 politically	 difficult.	 Policymakers	 in	 these	 contexts	 fight	 nail	 and	 tooth	 to	 avoid	 any	
serious	reforms	as	long	as	possible.	Crisis	management	in	these	countries	is	difficult:	political	
turmoil	 and	 public	 protests	 abound.	 Reforms	 are	 delayed.	 Support	 from	outside,	 typically	
the	 IMF,	 is	 usually	 called	 in	 to	 cover	 the	 financing	 needs	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 resolute	 crisis	
management	 generates.	 And	 when	 policymakers	 cannot	 avoid	 implementing	 reforms	 in	
return	for	 this	outside	support,	 they	usually	design	these	reforms	 in	ways	that	shield	their	
core	voters	and	targets	those	that	are	politically	least	influential	(Walter,	2016).	
We	 can	 use	 our	 data	 from	 the	December	 2015	 survey	 to	 explore	 the	 vulnerability	
profiles	of	Greek	voters.	To	construct	the	vulnerability	profiles	we	relied	on	two	questions,	
which	asked	how	respondents	assessed	the	consequences	of	the	reforms	agreed	on	 in	the	
memorandum	for	the	third	bailout	package	(i.e.,	further	austerity)	and	the	consequences	of	
Greece	 leaving	 the	 euro,	 respectively,	 on	 their	 personal	 income.	 Respondents	 who	 fully	
agreed	 with	 the	 statement	 that	 each	 of	 these	 policy	 paths	 would	 lead	 to	 “a	 significant	
reduction	 in	 [their]	 personal	 income	 were	 coded	 as	 very	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 respective	
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strategy.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 for	 both	 policy	 options	 about	 two-thirds	 of	 respondents	
classified	themselves	as	very	vulnerable.		
By	combining	these	answers,	we	can	code	the	vulnerability	profiles	of	respondents.	
Figure	6	shows	that	the	majority	of	Greeks	(at	least	subjectively)	find	themselves	in	the	very	
difficult	position	of	being	very	vulnerable	to	both	further	austerity	and	a	Greek	exit	from	the	
Eurozone.	 Almost	 half	 of	 all	 respondents	 (47%)	 fall	 into	 this	 category.8	 But	 there	 are	 also	
some	respondents	who	view	themselves	as	not	vulnerable	to	any	of	these	options	(14%),	or	
only	vulnerable	to	one	of	these	options	(21%	who	are	vulnerable	to	austerity,	but	not	Grexit,	
and	18%	who	are	vulnerable	to	Grexit,	but	not	austerity).9		
	
Figure	6:	Vulnerability	profiles	of	Greek	respondents	
	
Note:	Respondents	who	fully	agree	with	the	statement	“I	expect	a	significant	reduction	in	my	personal	income	
if	 Greece	 fully	 implements	 the	 reforms	 agreed	 on	 in	 the	 memorandum”	 are	 coded	 as	 very	 vulnerable	 to	
austerity,	 those	 fully	 agreeing	 to	 the	 statement	 “I	 expect	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 my	 personal	 income	 if	
Greece	leaves	the	euro“	are	coded	as	very	vulnerable	to	euro	exit.	
	
																																																						
8	If	we	include	those	who	somewhat	agree	that	each	policy	would	lead	to	significant	income	losses	for	them,	
almost	two	thirds	(65%)	of	respondents	exhibit	this	vulnerability	profile.	
9	The	respective	numbers	for	the	broader	definition	of	vulnerabilities	are	6%	(none),	15%	(only	austerity)	and	
14%	(only	Grexit).	
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Not	surprisingly,	different	vulnerability	profiles	are	also	associated	with	differences	in	
respondents’	 policy	 preferences	 and	 expectations.	 Most	 noteworthy	 is	 that	 the	 policy	
preferences	 of	 those	 with	 a	 vulnerability	 to	 both	 austerity	 and	 Grexit	 tend	 to	 be	
incompatible:	Figure	7	shows	that	they	want	to	keep	the	euro	(panel	I),	but	are	opposed	to	
the	austerity	measures	agreed	to	in	the	third	bailout	package	(panel	II).	In	essence,	they	are	
fighting	 the	austerity-Grexit	 tradeoff.	 In	contrast,	 those	vulnerable	 to	only	one	adjustment	
path	 tend	 to	 exhibit	more	 consistent	 preferences.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 those	with	 a	 strong	
joint	vulnerabilit	are	also	disillusioned:	they	are	rather	pessimistic	that	leaving	the	Eurozone	
would	imply	less	austerity	(panel	III)	and	are	relatively	convinced	that	Tsipras	will	implement	
the	austerity	measures	agreed	with	the	Troika	(panel	IV).		
	
Figure	7:	Vulnerability	profiles,	policy	preferences,	and	expectations	
	
	
Overall,	figure	7	shows	one	reason	why	crisis	resolution	has	been	so	difficult	and	slow	
in	Greece:	with	almost	half	the	population	vulnerable	to	any	changes,	serious	reform	is	likely	
to	be	hugely	unpopular	and	politically	costly.	
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Conclusion	
Although	doomsayers	have	predicted	 the	demise	of	 the	euro	since	 the	outbreak	of	
the	 eurozone	 crisis,	 the	 common	 currency	has	 so	 far	 proven	 remarkably	 resilient.	Neither	
piecemeal	reforms	nor	harsh	austerity	measures	in	the	crisis	countries	have	led	to	a	breakup	
of	 the	 Eurozone,	 or	 an	 exit	 from	 a	 single	 Eurozone	 member.	 The	 consistent	 and	 strong	
support	 for	 the	euro	among	voters	 throughout	 the	eurozone	has	played	a	key	 role	 in	 this	
respect,	 because	 it	 has	 made	 governments	 willing	 and	 able	 to	 implement	 policies	 that	
conventional	 political	 economy	 accounts	 would	 have	 classified	 as	 politically	 suicidal.	
Maintaining	 public	 support	 for	 the	 common	 currency	 is	 thus	 a	 key	 requirement	 for	 the	
sustainability	of	EMU.		
To	 examine	 why	 the	 euro	 is	 so	 popular	 among	 Europeans	 in	 the	 Eurozone,	 and	
whether	 this	 support	 could	unravel	at	 some	point,	 this	paper	has	 focusing	on	Greece,	 the	
country	that	has	suffered	most	during	the	crisis.	Using	original	survey	data,	we	showed	that	
uncertainty	and	risk	aversion	might	play	a	special	role	in	why	Greek	citizens	have	continued	
supporting	being	part	or	 the	Eurozone,	despite	the	austerity	measures	to	be	 implemented	
with	 the	 latest	MoU.	Honing	 in	especially	on	 the	 trade-off	between	keeping	 the	euro	and	
reducing	 austerity,	 our	 analysis	 showed	 that	 the	 events	 surrounding	 the	 2015	 bailout	
referendum,	which	demonstrated	clearly	 that	euro	membership	could	not	be	had	without	
austerity,	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 common	 currency,	 even	 though	 a	
majority	of	Greeks	continues	to	support	 it.	Yet	 it	 is	 less	enthusiasm	for	the	euro,	but	fears	
about	 the	consequences	of	a	“Grexit”	 that	 fuel	 this	 support.	As	 the	costs	of	austerity	 rise,	
however,	Grexit	becomes	more	attractive	–	or	less	scary	-	to	voters.	This	suggests	that	it	 is	
indeed	possible	that	a	tipping	point	might	be	reached	at	some	point,	in	which	Greeks	start	to	
opt	 for	 an	uncertain	 future	outside	 the	euro	over	 a	 future	within	under	 certain	 and	 long-
term	austerity.	
Overall,	our	paper	provides	an	explanation	why	political	elites	so	far	have	been	able	
to	commit	to	painful	austerity	and	reforms:	the	strong	public	support	for	the	euro	gave	them	
a	clear	mandate	to	everything	necessary	to	stay	in	the	euro.	This	finding	is	relevant	for	the	
debate	about	 the	“democratic	 legitimacy”	of	 the	 imposed	austerity	policies,	which	 several	
authors	 find	 lacking	 (e.g.,	Armingeon	&	Guthmann,	2014;	Armingeon	et	al.,	2016;	Scharpf,	
2013).	Our	research	suggests	in	contrast,	that	the	path	chosen	may	not	have	been	without	
	 25	
any	democratic	 legitimacy	 after	 all:	 given	 that	 the	 alternative	 to	 austerity,	 euro	exit,	 is	 so	
deeply	 unpopular	 among	 the	 public,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 path	 chosen	 was	 still	 in	 line	 with	
voters’	preferences.	
Nonetheless,	 our	 results	 also	 suggest	 that	 this	 could	 change	 when	 the	 costs	 of	
austerity	become	too	high,	making	an	exit	 for	 the	Eurozone	a	distinct	possibility.	Although	
the	political	 elites	 so	 far	have	had	a	 clear	mandate	 to	everything	necessary	 to	 stay	 in	 the	
euro,	the	incentives	for	the	elites	will	change	when	the	public	starts	preferring	a	Eurozone	
exit	to	further	austerity.		
This	 latter	 point	 is	 a	 really	 important	 one	 for	 the	 future	 of	 European	 integration:	
When	 the	 euro	was	 founded,	 it	was	 clear	 to	many,	 including	many	 politicians,	 that	 crises	
would	happen	and	would	create	huge	pressures	to	push	European	integration	further.	Yet,	
the	 price	 may	 be	 so	 high	 that	 a	 complete	 meltdown	 also	 appears	 possible	 if	 support	
suddenly	collapses	
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Table	A.1:	Statements	on	the	euro	
Statement	 Variable	
Economic	considerations	
		
	
The	fact	that	Greece	grew	strongly	in	the	years	following	
the	introduction	of	the	euro	shows	that	the	euro	is	good	for	
Greece.	
		
Past	Growth	
Leaving	the	euro	would	mean	that	Greece	would	have	to	
implement	less	austerity	measures.	
		
Less	Austerity	
I	expect	a	significant	reduction	in	my	personal	income	if	
Greece	leaves	the	euro.	
		
Less	Income	
In	the	long-run,	my	income	will	be	more	stable	if	Greece	
stays	in	the	Eurozone	
Stability	
Keeping	the	euro	is	best	for	Greece	because	no	one	knows	
what	would	happen	if	Greece	left	the	euro.	
Uncertainty	
Political	considerations		 	
Without	pressure	from	the	European	institutions,	the	Greek	
government	would	not	be	implementing	any	reforms.	
		
Reforms	
Being	part	of	the	Eurozone	forces	Greek	policymakers	to	
act	more	responsibly.	
Responsibility	
Attitudes	towards	Europe/EU	 	
Being	part	of	the	Eurozone	shows	that	Greece	is	part	of	the	
heart	of	Europe.		
Heart	of	Europe	
Leaving	the	Euro	is	the	beginning	of	the	end	for	
Greece’smembership	in	the	EU	
End	EU	
	
